The Persona of Sam Bahadur – A Tribute

Much has been written about Sam Manekshaw. There are documents that cover a broad canvas of the life and times of the Field Marshal in intimate detail and bring to our attention some not so well-known facets of his life.

Many are highly lucid, deeply researched and comprehensive presentations on Field Marshal Manekshaw, as also his family. They undoubtedly bring out the qualities of head and heart for which this great military leader of India was known for and much adored.

These bring out many valuable insights on how Sam Bahadur, as he was known to both soldiers and others, behaved in varied situations in both peace and war. His forte was to remain cool and yet give pragmatic decisions, even in highly adverse situations.

As GOC-in-C Eastern Command in his office

So, why am I writing yet another epistle on this great leader of India and why now? There are many reasons, but perhaps two will suffice. First, during this week, 52 years ago, the great Sam Bahadur was leading our nation for the ‘victory of victories’ on two widely separated fronts – Western and Eastern; the nation needs to remember and cherish this stupendous event.

Second, the Field Marshal is back in the public limelight, through an entirely different medium, this time as a biopic on his life and times. Let me clarify, at the outset, that this is neither a film review or a critique of the movie, which has been featured in all types of the nation’s media – print, electronic and social.

I should also confess that I have not seen the reel version and as yet and having touched base with the great leader of our country many decades ago, I may well get disappointed, for the difference between ‘reel’ and ‘real’ are at times poles apart. This piece, therefore, is a personal tribute to a great son of India.

What can we learn from Sam’s outstanding personality? Three major qualities stand out. These are professional competence; impeccable character; and the ability to take adversity in one’s stride. I will try to cover these, among others.

It is always better to start at the beginning and do full justice to the icon of the Nation. Sam Manekshaw was born on April 3, 1914 in Amritsar, a city where I had spent many of my growing-up years, before joining the National Defence Academy (NDA) in 1957. His father, a doctor, and mother (Hilla née Mehta) were a Parsi couple, who moved to Amritsar from Valsad in the coastal Gujarat region.

In 1903, they had left Bombay for Lahore, but by the time their train halted at Amritsar, Hilla, who was expecting, found it impossible to travel any further. The couple broke their journey temporarily, but liked Amritsar and elected to settle in the city. The couple had six children over the following decade, four sons and two daughters, of whom Sam was their fifth child and third son.

As a boy, Sam was mischievous and high-spirited, like most boys his age. He completed his primary schooling in Amritsar, and then went to Sherwood College, Nainital. In 1929, he left the college at the age of 15 with his Junior Cambridge Certificate.

Later, he joined the Hindu Sabha College (now the Hindu College, Amritsar), and in April 1932 graduated from the University of Punjab, with a third division in science.

The Manekshaw Family

The young Manekshaw joined the first intake of the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, in 1932. On commissioning, his initial attachment was with a British regiment - the 2nd Battalion, Royal Scots, stationed at Lahore.

He was later commissioned into the 4th Battalion, 12th Frontier Force Regiment. In World War II, he was awarded the Military Cross for gallantry, while fighting in the Burma Front.

Gentleman Cadet Sam Manekshaw with his battalion in NWFP

After Independence of India in 1947, he was reassigned to the 8th Gorkha Rifles, while serving in the Military Operations (MO) Directorate. There he was involved in both assisting the government in the amalgamation of Princely States, and planning and executing the India-Pakistan War of 1947-48.

During his term at the MO Directorate, he was promoted to Colonel, then Brigadier, when he was appointed as the first Indian Director of Military Operations (DMO). He commanded an infantry brigade from 1952 to 1954 at Ferozepur in Punjab and then he took over as the Director of Military Training at Army Headquarters.

After completing the higher command course at the Imperial Defence College in the United Kingdom, he commanded 26 Infantry Division, with its headquarters at Jammu and was later Commandant Defence Services Staff College. While there, his opponents tried to label him as unpatriotic, and he was charged with sedition. More about it later.

A well-known quote

His exoneration coincided with the 1962 War with China. After the major debacle in the War, Sam was appointed to command IV Corps in November 1962. The next year, he was promoted and took over command of Western Command, which I had the honour to command many years later, from where he side-stepped as Army Commander Eastern Command.

Manekshaw became the seventh Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) in 1969. Under his command, Indian forces conducted victorious campaigns against Pakistan in the War of 1971, which led to the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971. He was awarded the second and third highest civilian awards of India, the Padma Vibhushan and Padma Bhushan.

While he was commanding 26 Infantry Division in Jammu, Gen K.S. Thimayya was the COAS, and Krishna Menon was the Defence Minister and thereby is a story that is worth narrating!

During a visit to Manekshaw's division, Menon asked him what he thought of Thimayya. Manekshaw replied: "Mr. Minister, I am not allowed to think about him. He is my Chief. Tomorrow, you will be asking my brigadiers and colonels what they think of me. It's the surest way to ruin the discipline of the Army. Don't do it in future”.

This annoyed Menon, and he told Manekshaw that if he wanted to, he could sack Thimayya, to which Manekshaw replied, "You can get rid of him. But then I will get another."

Thereafter, Sam was hounded by Krishna Menon and a coterie of sycophants in the Army, headed by Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul, on frivolous grounds. This was met with disapproval by many senior army officers, including Manekshaw, whose comments about the interference of the political leadership in the administration of the Army led him to be marked as an anti-national.

Manekshaw was charged with Sedition, and subjected to a court of inquiry. It was widely believed that Manekshaw had come close to being dismissed from the service.

The court comprising three Lt Gens, presided over by GOC-in-C Western Command, Lt Gen Daulet Singh, known for his integrity, exonerated Manekshaw. Meanwhile, two of his juniors, Harbaksh Singh and Moti Sagar, were promoted and appointed as corps commanders.

Before a formal 'no case to answer' could be announced, the Sino-India War broke out in 1962. Manekshaw was not able to participate because of the court proceedings. The Indian Army suffered a debacle in the war, for which Kaul and Menon were held primarily responsible, and both were sacked.

Manekshaw had taken the entire episode in his stride, as he was blameless and never victimised or harassed those who had placed him in that awful position. When someone who has been shamed and humiliated, refuses to inflict his pain and anguish on others, we witness moral greatness and the creation of an aura that endures!

In November 1962, command of IV Corps was given to Manekshaw. Soon after taking charge, he reached the conclusion that poor leadership had been a significant factor in IV Corps' failure in the war with China.

Manekshaw felt that his foremost responsibility was to improve the morale of his demoralised soldiers, which he achieved by ordering them to operate more aggressively. His most famous order issued on taking over the Corps was: “There will be no withdrawal except under my orders and such orders will never be issued!” The next task Manekshaw took up was to reorganise the troops and commence measures to overcome shortages of equipment, accommodation, and clothing.

Manekshaw directing a wargame in the Eastern Command

Manekshaw was appointed the army commander of Western Command on December 5 1962. In 1964, he moved from Shimla to Calcutta as the GOC-in-C Eastern Command. There, he operated aggressively against the insurgency in Nagaland, for which he was awarded the Padma Bhushan in 1968.

Manekshaw was appointed as the eighth Chief Of Army Staff on June 8 1969. He was an efficient Chief and was well-liked by the troops. During his tenure, he was instrumental in stopping a political plan to reserve positions in the army for Scheduled Castes and Tribes. He felt that the practice would compromise the ethos of the army and believed that all must be given an equal chance.

As the COAS, Manekshaw once visited a battalion of 8 Gorkha Rifles in July 1969. He asked a soldier if he knew the name of his chief. The soldier replied that he did, and on being asked to name the chief, he said "Sam Bahadur". This eventually became Manekshaw's nickname.

Sam Bahadur was loved by the troops

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was sparked by a conflict between the traditionally dominant West Pakistan and the majority East Pakistan. After the elections in 1970, when the East Pakistani Awami League had gained the majority, the clique of Z.A. Bhutto and Gen Yahya Khan refused to hand over power to the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

In early 1971, a demand for secession took root in East Pakistan. The Pakistani Army launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971, against the people of East Pakistan. Lt Gen Tikka Khan was Governor and General Officer Commanding East Pakistan.

The Army was given a free hand for using maximum force, resulting in a genocide of Bengalis. All domestic and international communications were cut and all Bengali troops were neutralised by seizing their weapons and ammunition.

By April 10, Pakistan had airlifted two Infantry Divisions from West to East Pakistan and had gained control over all big cities. Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi had assumed command of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan on 11 April 1971.

The continuing military operations by the Pakistani Army had resulted in a large-scale exodus of refugees, numbering nearly 10 million fleeing to India. Over 30 million were also displaced internally. Bangladesh government figures estimate that some three million people were killed by the Pakistani army.

By April 1971 the Indian leadership was convinced that a war with Pakistan was inevitable. There were two opposing views about when to wage war. One view was that the Indian Army should commence operations at the earliest and assist the Bangladeshis who had launched their war of liberation. This view was generally advocated by some political leaders, some other Congress Party leaders and some officers of the Border Security Force.

The second view was of the Indian Army, and particularly of its Chief General Sam Manekshaw, who were of the view that the operations should be launched more deliberately after due planning and creating logistics infrastructure. For this, the Indian Army required 6-9 months for preparations for an assured victory.

During a Cabinet meeting towards the end of April, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked Manekshaw if he was prepared to go to war with Pakistan. He gave an emphatic no for an answer, and listed the problems, which included, mustering troops and dumping equipment; filling up deficiencies; approaching monsoons, which would make movement off roads impossible; Himalayan Passes being open and other important factors.

Manekshaw assured her that he could guarantee victory if she would allow him to handle the conflict on his terms. Prime Minister Gandhi agreed.

Though India had an edge in numbers on the Eastern Front, the superiority was not large enough, being less than two to one, as the Western Front had also to be catered for. The only way the operations could be hastened was to evolve audacious plans that relied on manoeuvre and use of unconventional means.

Risks had to be taken, as it was envisaged that international pressure to stop hostilities would escalate, especially as the United States had decided to support Pakistan.

Following the strategy planned by Manekshaw, the Army launched several preparatory operations in East Pakistan, including training and equipping the Mukti Bahini, a local militia group of Bengali nationalists. About three brigades of regular Bangladeshi troops were also trained, and 75,000 guerrillas were trained and equipped with arms and ammunition. These forces were used to harass the Pakistani Army stationed in East Pakistan and support the Indian forces.

The war formally commenced on December 3 1971, when Pakistani aircraft bombed Indian Air Force bases in the western part of the country.

It was at this stage that I had the honour of interacting with Sam Bahadur in Army Headquarters. After completing my Staff College Course at Wellington, I was posted to MO Directorate, as an operational staff officer.

I had a little over 10 years’ service and was a junior Major. I was assigned the desk dealing with operations in the Eastern Front. I also had a hotline on my table linked to Eastern Command.

As my table was next to the door, the Chief came a number of times, sat on my desk, waving off a chair, mostly to speak to COS HQ Eastern Command. His favourite order was: “Get me Jakes”, meaning Maj. Gen. Jacob, COS HQ Eastern Command!

I vividly remember the Chief coming to my table and articulating his familiar sentence: “Get me Jakes” on December 11 and when the COS, Gen. Jacob was connected, he said, “tell Sagat that I want Dacca under artillery fire in the next 48 hours”.

Manekshaw would come on most days for the morning briefing in the Operations Room. I used to brief him on operations of the Eastern Front while officers dealing with the Western Front did the same for operations of Southern and Western Commands.

What we had not realised was that prior to coming for the briefing, he used to speak to one or two selected corps commanders and thus was slightly better informed than us. I recall that one day while briefing him I said that fierce fighting was going on for the capture of a bridge and that it should fall soon.

On hearing this, he calmly stated with finality: “it has been captured”, since he had spoken to the concerned corps commander only minutes before coming to the Operations Room!

Major Gen. Inder Gill was the DMO. He was not only a great warrior but also a staff officer par excellence. He not only handled all operations, but ensured that all Branches and Directorates also carried out their tasks with alacrity.

Whenever the Chief visited the MO Directorate, which was sometimes more than once, one of his staff officers used to warn us. As soon as we got the message, we would inform the DMO.

I recall that one morning when I informed Gen. Gill that the Chief was on his way, he told me to tell him that he was busy and could not see him and that I should deal with him. For a junior Major, it appeared a gigantic task to answer the queries of the Chief, but Manekshaw took it in his stride, came to our office, sat down on my desk and enquired how we were coping.

No wonder the Chief and the DMO worked extremely well as a team. I was lucky to serve with both and especially during war, the nearest one could get to actual operations!

As the war progressed, Pakistan's resistance crumbled. India captured most of the advantageous positions and isolated the Pakistani forces, which started to surrender or withdraw. The UN Security Council resolutions for a ceasefire were vetoed by the Soviet Union twice.

Manekshaw addressed the Pakistani troops in East Pakistan by radio broadcasts on December 9, 11 and 15, assuring them that they would receive honourable treatment from the Indian troops if they surrendered. The last two broadcasts were delivered as replies to messages from the Pakistani commanders Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali and Lt. Gen. Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi to their troops.

The actual decision to surrender was taken by Niazi on December 15 and was conveyed to Manekshaw. Manekshaw stuck to his stand that he would stop the war only if the Pakistani troops surrendered to their Indian counterparts by 09:00 hours on December 16.

The deadline was extended to 15:00 hours the same day at Niazi's request, and the Instrument of Surrender was formally signed on 16 December 1971 by Lt. Gen. Niazi at the Dacca Race Course.

Surrender at Dhaka

When the prime minister asked Manekshaw to go to Dhaka and accept the surrender of Pakistani forces, he declined, saying that the honour should go to GOC-in-C Eastern Command, Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora. This too was a facet of his character.

Concerned about maintaining discipline in the aftermath of the conflict, Manekshaw issued strict instructions forbidding looting and rape and stressed the need to respect and stay away from women. As a result, cases of looting and rape were negligible.

In addressing his troops on the matter, Manekshaw was quoted as saying: "When you see a Begum, keep your hands in your pockets, and think of Sam Bahadur."

Felicitations after the war: With President, Prime Minister; Rakshra Mantri Babu Jagjivan Ram with the three chiefs: Sam Maneskshaw, Admiral S.M. Nanda and Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal

The war on the Eastern Front was for 12 days, and the result included nearly 94,000 Pakistani soldiers and families taken prisoner. It ended with the unconditional surrender of Pakistan's eastern half and resulted in the birth of Bangladesh as a new nation. In addition to the POWs, Pakistan suffered 6,000 casualties against India's 2,000.

After the war, Manekshaw became known for his compassion towards the POWs. In some cases, he addressed them personally and talked to them privately, with just his ADC for company, while they shared a cup of tea. He ensured that they were well treated by the Indian Army, made provisions for them to be supplied with the copies of the Quran, and allowed them to celebrate festivals and receive letters and parcels from their loved ones.

With troops on the Western Front

After the war, Indira Gandhi decided to promote Manekshaw to the rank of field marshal and appoint him as the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). However, after several objections, including from the navy, the air force and the bureaucracy, the appointment was dropped.

Though Manekshaw was to retire in June 1972, his term was extended by six months, and "in recognition of outstanding services to the Armed Forces and the nation," he was promoted to the rank of field marshal on 01 January 1973. He was formally conferred with the rank in a ceremony held at the Rashtrapati Bhavan on January 3.

Manekshaw being decorated

Manekshaw retired from active service on January 15 1973, after a career of nearly four decades; he settled with his wife, Silloo, in Coonoor, the civilian town next to Wellington Cantonment, where he had served as commandant of the Defence Services Staff College earlier in his career.

A few snippets may be in order in this closing phase of this tribute. Manekshaw’s humour was well known. As he was about to sign a letter to the Raksha Mantri, Manekshaw noticed a typo in the signature block. Instead of the ‘C’ in his designation, a ‘T’ had got typed, making it now read: “Thief of the Army Staff”.

He didn’t sign the letter, but promptly put a circle in red ink around the word ‘Thief’, marked the letter back to the Adjutant General from whom the letter had been received, also in red ink and wrote: “May be true, but keep it within the Army, Goddamn it!!”

Manekshaw, then a Colonel, and his wife met Indira Gandhi on board a passenger ship from Bombay to the UK in 1948. Gandhi was travelling with her sons after an alleged break up with Feroze, while Manekshaw was leading a delegation for weapons. It was a friendship that lasted a lifetime but remained out of the public eye.

Despite their friendship Manekshaw stopped Gandhi from entering the 4 Corps Operations Room at Tezpur when she accompanied Nehru for a review of the situation after the debacle in 1962; Manekshaw had replaced B.M. Kaul as GOC 4 Corps. He is supposed to have told her, "You don’t have the necessary security clearance, please wait in the next room!”

Years later, when Gandhi was PM and came to the Army HQ Operations Room for her first briefing, she is reported to have teased Manekshaw saying, "Hope I have the necessary security clearance now?" Manekshaw smiled and replied "Yes Prime Minister".

In 1969, when Manekshaw was the Army Commander at Calcutta, the wedding reception after the marriage of actor Sharmila Tagore and Mansoor Ali Khan, Indian cricket captain and the nawab of Pataudi, was being celebrated at the Army club in Fort William.

On account of the inter-faith marriage, a huge mob had started gathering outside. It soon became a major challenge to ensure safe passage for the couple.

As the tension mounted, the couple were taken out of Fort William in Sam’s 1937 Austin Sheer line Car that was as famous as Manekshaw and hence enjoyed easy passage. It perhaps saved the couple as they made their way out of the club. Manekshaw had thus prevented what could have been a tragedy that day.

Manekshaw’s car that saved the day

A ‘Manikshawism’

Manekshaw with wife and daughter

Following his service in the Indian Army, Manekshaw served as an independent director on the board of several companies and, in a few cases, as the chairman. He was outspoken and at times, he did not observe ‘political correctness’, but he never lost his sense of humour.

Once when he was replaced on the board of a company by a man named Naik at the behest of the government, Manekshaw quipped, "This is the first time in history when a Naik (corporal) has replaced a field marshal."

Although Manekshaw was conferred the rank of Field Marshal in 1973, he was not given pay and allowances to which he was entitled. It was not until 2007 that President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam had insisted that he must get his dues that this was done.

Manekshaw died of complications from pneumonia at the Military Hospital in Wellington, Tamil Nadu, on June 27 2008 at the age of 94. He was buried in the Parsi cemetery in Ootacamund (Ooty), Tamil Nadu, with military honours, adjacent to his wife's grave.

Owing to the controversies in which Manekshaw was involved post-retirement, it was reported that his funeral lacked VIP representation, and no national day of mourning was declared which, while not a breach of protocol, was not customary for a leader of such national importance. He is survived by his two daughters and three grandchildren.

Let me end on a somber note. Although the public always made much of him, and expressed their pride and honour our military heroes, but as a nation we treat them shabbily. The case of Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw is a sad example.

It is a shame that the only General who, in our long history, gave us a decisive victory in the 1971 War was so disgracefully treated by the establishment. Every effort was made to deny this great military leader what he was entitled to and fully deserved.

While the government could not take away his rank of Field Marshal, it did take away everything else and treated him shabbily. He retired in January 1973; although by convention Field Marshals never retire but get full pay and allowances as well as perquisites till death.

It took the Government of India 36 years to decide his pay scale and entitlements. When he was in Military Hospital in June 2007, during his last illness, a bureaucrat, who is usually referred to as a ‘babu’, called on him and handed over a cheque of Rs. one crore sixty lakhs towards arrears of his entitlement.

That is how the august functionaries of a heartless system, with their egos and spiteful attitudes, act and function and also control our destinies. Imagine what went through the Field Marshal’s mind, but even then, he did not lose his sense of humour. Even on his deathbed, Manekshaw joked while receiving the cheque by telling the bureaucrat, "I hope the cheque won't bounce."

It was a case of too little, too late. He was also given his perks, but obviously Manekshaw turned them down, for at age 93, what would he have done with them, especially when he was confined to a hospital bed.

A few days later on June 27, 2007, he passed away. None of the VVIPs of Delhi was present at his funeral. That’s how the politico-bureaucratic establishment chose to honour the victor of the 1971 War – a great soldier who restored the ‘izzat’ of the Indian fauj after the debacle of the 1962 China war, and the honor of the motherland, by instilling a sense of confidence in a de-moralised nation.

You can well imagine the sense of hurt at the bureaucratic and political apathy, which continues to run deep in the forces.

Lt General Vijay Oberoi is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff and the Former Founder Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), and now its Director General Emeritus. Views expressed are the writer’s own.