Indian Footprint In The North Korean Imbroglio?

The Hermit Kingdom of North Korea is in the throes of unprecedented possibilities that could either end the hostilities that date back to the unsettled impulses of World War 2, or it could escalate to the chilling reality of a biological, chemical and nuclear weapons hara-kiri, of unimaginable holocaustic proportions.

Unlike the unverified and unconfirmed threats of the ostensible Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s) with Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army, the North Koreans have a known arsenal of the most sophisticated and devastating chemical weaponry (estimates suggest 5000 tons of nerve agents like VX and Sarin, which can paralyse, cripple and kill in gruesome randomness), artillery guns and rocket launchers specifically facing the Seoul metropolis with a population of 10 million, which could get flattened with a rain of 10,000 rockets per minute, besides demonstrating Inter-Continental-Ballistic-Missile (ICBM) capabilities that according to the US Defense Secretary James Mattis could hit ‘everywhere in the world’.

The North Koreans adhere to ‘Songun’ (military-first) policy, which ensures that the security dimensions are to be above all other socio-economic, civic or diplomatic imperatives of governance. With this backdrop, US President Donald Trump has rested his initial and amateurish bravado against the ‘little rocket man’ and threats to rain ‘fire and fury’, and instead has accepted a meeting with himself and the North Korea leader, Kim Jung-un, at Singapore on 12 June.

The tentativeness to the summit is palpable and susceptible to any suspicion that haunts the Korean peninsula. The US, Japanese and the South Koreans decided to shift the usual flight routes of its nuclear-capable B-52 bombers over the Korean peninsula in order to allay North Korean concerns of continuing ‘military exercises’ that could derail the planned summit.

The past experiences of the Libyan dictator Muammar Gadhafi (who forsook the Libyan nuclear program and still met his fate) and more recently the reneging of the Iranian Nuclear Deal, has made the North Korean justifiably wary of the American commitments. From Pyongyang, Washington DC, Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing, the immediate-impact capitals are on an overdrive to conceptualise, devise and cast the possible deals and scenarios that could emerge as final outcome of the proposed meeting.

Various permutations and combinations are getting worked out with the US no longer insisting on regime-change, unlike its unwarranted enthusiasm and insistence in doing so in both Syria and Iran.

Besides the Koreans and the Americans, it is the Chinese who have the most stakes in the geopolitical and geostrategic implications of the possible rapprochement, and as a practice, the Chinese are never peripheral players concerning development in the region. China has been North Korea’s steadiest supporter with Mao Zedong having described the relationship as interdependent as ‘lips to teeth’ – with over 90% of trade with China, the North Koreans sustain themselves due to the Chinese beneficence.

The ideal outcome of a ‘denuclearized Korean peninsula’ from a Chinese and North Korean perspective would be the giving up of nuclear program in exchange for the US permanently withdrawing their nuclear shield and military footprint from the region, and the regime-continuation in Pyongyang, which suits both the North Koreans and the Chinese in the long-term.

While New Delhi is not directly involved in the core confabulations concerning the summit, yet India is delicately positioned as a rare country with a semblance of access and a working relationship with the North Koreans – it has had diplomatic relationship for decades and was supposed to be second or third biggest trade partner before the economic sanctions of 2017. Conversely, there are growing portents in the West of India’s role as the ‘pivot to Asia’ to counterweight China, in the long run – this makes the Indian equation with the North Koreans invaluable in terms of potential intervention as a interlocutor on behalf of the US, as unlike the Chinese, the Indians would have more aligned interests.

Obviously India does not have the depth or equity in terms of a relationship that the North Koreans repose in the Chinese, yet, as an emerging powerhouse in Asia, it is essential that New Delhi demonstrates the optics of reach, intent and ambition.

The visit of MOS External Affairs, Gen VK Singh (Retd) is legitimate on account of his Ministerial responsibilities, but more pertinently, as a former Chief of Indian Army, he would be able to better-digest and appreciate the nuances of security dimensions, which is the essential construct of the Korean imbroglio.

While the supposed visit agenda revolved around ‘a range of issues covering political, regional, economic, educational and cultural cooperation between the two countries’, the timing of the visit raised eyebrows, as also the fact that North Korea was willing to entertain such a ministerial visit, in the midst of much larger implications and concerns for itself. Importantly as the official statement read,

Gen VK did slip in an India-specific concern, “[Mr. Singh] highlighted the threat from nuclear proliferation, in particular India’s concerns in the context of the proliferation linkages with India’s neighbourhood. The DPRK side emphasized that as a friendly country DPRK will never allow any action that would create concerns for India’s security”.

The allusion to neighbouring Pakistan was unmistakable, even though the nuclear proliferation involving the infamous Pakistani nuclear-scientist Dr AQ Khan and the North Koreans is an old hat, Pakistan’s current dependence on North Korea’s sole benefactor, China, is an angularity that New Delhi keeps hawkeye on. The dynamics of the Chinese-North Korean security are so enmeshed that the Indian military attaché posted in Beijing, is also accredited to Pyongyang simultaneously. If nothing else, the visit signifies a rare reciprocal warmth that North Korea accords to a nation beyond China and Russia, and this opens the window to tap into the North Korean market and diplomacy, should the thawing in the Korean impasse take place. India has signaled its diplomatic ambitions to be beyond the arc of immediate neighbourhood and has invested in relatively ‘isolated’ countries like Mongolia (which like North Korea is also heavily dependent on China), and the Indian initiatives in Mongolia did concern the senior party apparatchiks in the Chinese politburo.

While the exact reasons for the urgent visit by the MOS External Affairs and the final outcome of the Singapore summit (if it still happens as planned) are still matters of conjecture, it is important that India showcases its diplomatic desire, reach and investment that befits a nation aspiring to be placed amongst the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

India has limited role in the North Korean stalemate however it need not remain irrelevant in future too, but most importantly it is deeply concerned with the two other elephants in the room, namely, China and US, who will invariably shape the geostrategic sweepstakes in such a way, that it interests India immensely to remain visible, concerned and invested.