Major Challenges Ahead For The New Army Chief

General Upendra Dwivedi, who has taken over as the 30th Chief Of The Army Staff (COAS) on July 1 2024 will command the third largest Army of the world in an environment that is full of major challenges.

Nearly three-fourth of the Army is committed in active operational tasks, including fighting various insurgencies; a proxy war and threat in being on one flank and a major confrontation with a superior and technological Army on the other. And all these are in the background of a plethora of internal issues that have to be dealt with simultaneously and with urgency.

These include raising the combat potential of the Army that is at an all-time low of nearly fifty percent, as per my reckoning. There has been little or no modernisation in decades, although the politico-bureaucratic leadership keeps making premature pronouncements to the contrary, based on future acquisitions in an indeterminate time frame.

The budget for the Army continues to get reduced every year in real terms; the deteriorating civil-military relations and the politicisation of the Armed Forces do not bode well for the safety and security of the nation.

Unfortunately, leaders with little knowledge of ‘Affairs Military’ have been forcing the armed forces to carry out professionally incorrect actions.

There are other negatives too. The electronic and to an extent print media have completely lost their independent reporting skills, and only sensationalise events that the powers that be want.

The status of the Armed Forces is dwindling continuously, adversely affecting the morale of the rank and file. The acute shortage of manpower, unwisely accumulated in the Covid years and then asking the Armed Forces to accept the ill thought-out ‘Agniveer’ concept, despite military advice or even a pilot project, is hurting the battalions and regiments, which constitute the real fighting force of the Indian Army.

No amount of sugar-coating and propaganda through loyalists can turn a wrong policy right.

Perhaps the biggest challenge for the new Army Chief is the organisational structures needed to smoothly co-opt and usher in the various changes relating to fielding theatre commands that have been under formulation for nearly three years and so far just the bare-bones have been made public.

While this subject falls squarely in the lap of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and his joint headquarters, all Chiefs and their principal advisor, as well as the C’s-in-C of all Services have major stakes in ensuring that the organisation that eventually emerges is operationally and logistically the best.

If it means shedding power at various levels, so be it. I plan to write a separate missive on the subject, so I will not do it any further here.

The resentment of the veterans’, consequent to the dragging of feet by the government on their long-pending demands relating to residual facets of one rank one pension (OROP); withdrawing disability concessions of disabled officers and soldiers and not granting Non Functional Upgradation (NFU) when their civilian counterparts continue to be entitled; miserly financial allocations for Ex-servicemen Central Health Scheme (ECHS), resulting in deprivation of medicines and use of designated and other hospital care, while liberally funding the CGHS meant for civil government employees is illogical; and the penchant of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) taking every case of genuine grievance to the higher courts, despite positive judgements delivered by higher courts, add to the disillusionment of the veterans.

Our officers and Jawans are undoubtedly brave and doughty warriors, but ‘enough is enough’ even for them. The situation highlighted above is possibly akin to the battlefield message sent by General Ferdinand Foch, at the first battle of the Marne, September 5 and 12 1914, “My centre is giving way, my right is retreating, situation excellent, I am attacking”.

Will the new Army Chief, who had cut his professional teeth in a proud and valorous infantry regiment, replicate this by being proactive with the Ministry of Defence (MoD)? The citizens of our country, who have great affection for the Army, do expect it from him.

Let me remind the new Chief that even if in future he goes on to hold other prestigious appointments in or outside the government, they will never be able to match this appointment – in prestige; in professional satisfaction; and the affection he will get from his vast command and indeed from the whole country.

He will also have to reciprocate to the maximum extent by his deeds and by projecting himself as the ‘General of Generals’. Consequently, he must command with honour and neither let carrots being dangled in his face nor pressures and threats change or influence the decisions he takes.

Notwithstanding the fact that the new Chief must have introspected on all facets of his new assignment, I do want to highlight a few issues that may assist him to reinforce, modify or negate the conclusions he may have reached.

They may also supplement the briefings he must be receiving daily at various locales from his C’s-in-C, staff and advisors, which may not always be completely objective. I have already highlighted some issues above, but a few more need to be added.

In democracies the world over, the political leadership makes national policy and the national security strategy, with the active participation of civil and military officials of the country. However, in India the military has been deliberately kept out of the policy formulation loop and even after nearly 75 years of loyal, patriotic and dedicated service to the nation, it is obvious that it is still not trusted!

Nothing else explains the reasons for its exclusion from policy formulations; the inability to evolve a viable and comprehensive structure for higher defence. Nothing explains the non-articulation of a national security strategy since Independence; the way the appointment of the CDS and structures around it, have been currently organised; the non-integration of the Ministry of Defence and service headquarters; and not the least, the muzzling of the four Chiefs, even when they speak on professional matters and say what needs to be said.

This state of affairs must change at the earliest. It is only the Army Chief with the support of the other Chiefs who can convince the political leadership of all parties that it is high time that they discard their doubts and stop listening to those advisors that have a vested interest in perpetuating this state of distrust of the military.

A related suggestion is to make the political leaders of the nation understand the true meaning of ‘civil control’. It implies the supremacy of the political leadership over both the military as well as the civil bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, our political leaders either do not understand this or find it easier not to understand it! The political leadership must deal with the military directly, just as they do with the bureaucracy and not through the latter, which is the case at present.

In its secondary role of assisting the civil authorities, the Army must be employed as a last resort and such employment must be for the minimum period. However, the reality is that because the Army delivers efficiently and with alacrity, it is being called out without first using the other instruments available to the government.

It is also being incorrectly employed on such tasks for prolonged periods, like in Nagaland, Assam and J&K for 60, 40 and 30 years respectively. Such long deployments on secondary roles adversely affect the combat potential of the Army, alienate the populace and lower the morale of the troops.

Units of the Central Police Forces (CPO’s) are continuously being raised and yet the Army deployments continue. Why?

The last issue relates to senior officers of the Army, who are the custodians of our value systems. It is unfortunate that in recent years the number of cases of misdemeanours by senior officers have increased. This trend needs to be arrested at the earliest.

The Army does have stringent norms for promotions and only the best get through successfully. However, to weed out the few whose motivational levels and Chedwodian thinking may have dropped or diluted, there needs to be greater emphasis on character qualities like integrity, moral strength; self-discipline; and social as well as domestic probity or rectitude in standards of selection for higher leadership.

Let me close this piece by extending my best wishes to the new Chief for an honourable and glorious command of the Indian Army.

Lt General Vijay Oberoi is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff and the Former Founder Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), and now its Director General Emeritus. Views expressed are the writer’s own.