Make Much Of The Armed Forces

The title of this piece may not be understandable to everyone, so let me explain. When we joined the National Defence Academy (NDA), horse riding was part of the curriculum for all cadets. Whenever we finished the ride and were dismounting from our horses, our NCO instructor gave the word of command “make much of your horses – 1,2,3” and we would pat the horses neck before dismounting!

Despite decades having passed, one still remembers and hence I chose it as the title of this article.

In many ways, the last two weeks of July were highly nationalistic and militarily oriented, as the 25th Anniversary of the Kargil War was celebrated overwhelmingly by the media, and also by the public. Rightly, both bouquets and brickbats were freely articulated, as it should be in a democracy.

The environment had been further accentuated by the sudden increase in the Pakistan-sponsored insurgency in the Jammu Region of Jammu & Kashmir. In addition, the upsetting results of the General Elections for the ruling party are also being felt in the political firmament and this instability is likely to stabilise only by the end of the year when the outcome of elections in three states become known.

In J&K, the Army has inducted additional troops and taken other measures, but the Home Ministry too is moving two Border Security Force (BSF) battalions and now two Assam Rifles battalions in the union territory from Manipur; the latter for ulterior motives perhaps, once again indicating lack of joint planning.

Such boosting of force levels is standard procedure, but it should not be left at that. Actions like beefing up intelligence gathering considerably, civic actions, simplifying grievances-solving mechanisms, and instilling a sense of safety amongst the public, which the civil administration, police and local political leaders must commence with vigour must take place simultaneously.

However, this piece is not about these subjects, as I want to delve into issues of greater importance that have been bedevilling the armed forces for long.

Among the pre-Independence political leaders who fought for our Independence, it was only Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose who had a visualisation of security strategies for independent India. These strategies had included a well-equipped military, robust diplomatic postures and political actions to ensure protection of our borders and other national interests in the international arena.

Sadly, despite a loyal and professionally competent military, successive governments have lost opportunities for modernising the military by starving it of funds.

The economy of the nation is now improving, but our foreign and security policies continue to be reactive and devoid of any assertiveness that a vast nation with a huge population of over 1.4 billion should have. Even Pakistan, a country one fifth of our size and population and in dire economic straits for quite some time, keeps managing to get funds from varied sources.

The main reason is indifference of successive governments to national security issues and placing undue importance to ‘soft power’, at the expense of ‘hard power’ or more accurately ‘smart power’.

It was the late George Tanham of the United States, who had highlighted in the early Eighties that India had no strategic tradition or culture; that it was an inward-looking country; that its defence establishment did not look and plan ahead; and it only reacts to threats as they arise.

The criticism is undoubtedly valid and even after nearly seven decades, we have done nothing to change this. The so-called muscularity of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments did not last for long.

Witness how the situation is frozen in Eastern Ladakh, after China’s military incursion. In addition, China’s activities on other portions of our Northern Borders seem to have been accepted as fait accompli.

The major reasons for the above are our inadequate and ineffective decision making structures; our committee systems of decision making; keeping the military outside the government and the policy-formulation loop.

They include a flawed structure for national security planning; a generalist civilian bureaucracy, which wants to constantly control the military; no effective mechanism to deal with trans-ministerial issues; no institutionalised coordination between defence, foreign and home ministries, as well as with scientific and economic departments; foisting police/intelligence/diplomatic officers as NSA’s, who have inadequate exposure on strategic security issues; and a poor intelligence analysis apparatus, which is highly compartmentalised.

We could have changed all or some of the above, but our politico-bureaucratic leadership is wedded to the ‘status quo’. So, we remain confined in our vertical silos with little lateral interaction.

Conventional wisdom would have us believe that the Indian Army played no part in the Independence movement and that we got our independence solely by the efforts of our “netas”. How wrong can one be?

While the Indian Army did not fight a war of Independence in the classic sense, it did contribute immensely to the British decision to leave India. This has now been confirmed in documents declassified by the British government in the last two years, wherein it has been unambiguously stated that the decision to leave India was taken when it was discerned that the loyalty of the Indian Army had become suspect.

Events leading up to this assessment were the formation of the Indian National Army (INA) in Singapore and the Indian Legion in Germany during World War II; the mutinies in the Navy, Army Signal regiment and the air force; the post-war demobilisation of nearly two million soldiers and 12,000 emergency commissioned officers; the national outcry at the court martial of three INA officers; and the demeanour of the Indian officers of the Army, who could not hide their nationalist feelings.

This had prompted General Auchinleck, then C-in-C, to write to the Army Commanders: “In this connection, it should be remembered, I think, that every Indian worthy of the name is today a ‘nationalist’, though this does not mean that he is necessarily ‘anti British’. All the same, where India and her independence are concerned there are no pro British Indians.”

Following Independence in 1947, organisational changes strengthened civilian control over the military. However, civilian control was deliberately misinterpreted as bureaucratic control.

The position of commander-in-chief was abolished and the three services were placed beneath the civilian Ministry of Defence. Over a period of time, the status of the military kept getting degraded and no attempt was made to integrate the military in the policy-formulation loop.

These changes reflected the suspicion and distrust of the political leadership toward the military, who saw it as an institution strongly wedded to the colonial past. The bureaucracy stoked such thinking on account of its vested interests.

In the early years of decolonisation, a large number of militaries of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa took over the governance of their countries, including in our immediate neighbourhood. However, such actions had no effect on the Indian Military, although there was large-scale dissatisfaction in many areas.

It is to the credit of the early leadership of the military that they managed the environment extremely well and contained the simmering discontent. It however, sent a wrong message to the political leadership, who instead of appreciating the sacrifices of the military continued with their short-sighted policies of steadily downgrading the military, both in status and emoluments.

In early 1971, the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, a colossus in her own right, was still suffering from latent fears over the military when she asked General (later field marshal) Manekshaw, the then Chief, whether he was planning to take over the country!

Such qualms should have evaporated by the end of the year when the same Chief presented to the nation an outstanding victory on December 16 1971. However, a few years later, the same Prime Minister, when imposing the emergency in the country, looked at support from the military, which in its best traditions, the then Army Chief ignored.

The military kept away from all the shenanigans of the political parties and their committed bureaucrats; for the military, it was business as usual!

Despite the above and even after the military has proved its credentials repeatedly and has endeared itself to the people, it is sad that the political leadership as well as their bureaucratic advisors still see the Army as a threat! This is despite even one act of disloyalty.

Over the last nearly seven decades, the Indian Army has earned a formidable reputation of a force that delivers, usually against heavy odds. It will continue to fight the nation’s challenges, giving its best, but the nation must also support it to the maximum extent, meet its aspirations and restore its “izzat”, besides alleviating its concerns and misgivings.

Lt General Vijay Oberoi is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff and the Former Founder Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), and now its Director General Emeritus. Views expressed are the writer’s own.