Our Unending Wars

Von Clausewitz had many aphorisms, of which the most famous is "War is the continuation of politics by other means." And today the ‘other means’ has graduated from direct conventional conflict to pursuing national objectives through low cost terror, proxy surrogate insurgents, disinformation or misinformation, propaganda, undermining instruments and institutions of state and in fact any means aimed at imposing your will on the adversary. We are witnessing all this in Jammu & Kashmir. That is where today’s war is being fought.

The tone of internal conflicts was set soon after Independence which was to be expected given the tricky amalgamation of the large number of quasi -independent entities coupled with regional aspirations, disparities and varied administrative arrangements left behind by colonialism. However, more than seven decades later these ought to have been resolved. Sadly they persist. Nagaland, Manipur, Naxalism in Central India and Jammu and Kashmir fester. Mizoram and Punjab being exceptions which found resolution. Conflict resolution is as important as conflict management.

Insurgency and terrorism, like border disputes, are basically political problems. The role of the armed instrument of state is to control and bring it down to a level where political initiatives can attempt settlement. The route being ‘military pacification followed by political concessions’. Mizoram and Northern Ireland are classic examples. Military force alone has never brought about a settlement.

The law mandates and authorises the civil administration to requisition the Army for ‘Aid to Civil Authority’ for restoring law and order or in situations of natural disasters. Inbuilt into the authority is the proviso that the civil administration has employed and exhausted all means available at its disposal and has no other option. Also built in the understanding that the civil administration resumes charge when the situation has been brought to a level to allow it to do so. The country has been battling cross border sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir for nearly three decades. Militarily, it has been brought down to a level to allow political initiatives to address local aspirations and cause of support for violence, regrettably, domestic politics has let such opportunities slip. Perhaps it has been deliberately allowed to slip into the prevailing status quo accepting that just as it is a low cost option for Pakistan, so is it for us. Let me explain.

When all instruments of state fail to contain the situation, the Army is employed, albeit for a role it is primarily not trained, structured and legally and constitutionally mandated. For any conflict which has a military dimension, the triad of Government, People and the Military must complement each other.

The Government must set clear policies and objectives, the people must support the objectives and the military must thereafter prosecute the military objectives from the sub conventional and in the ultimate to all-out war. A clearly defined politico-military objective is the base on which national policies are formulated, military capabilities created and action directed. In our case the triad does not appear to be on a stable footing with no clear objectives and end state. Vietnam was a classic example where the American triad failed totally.

National security is ultimately a question of evaluating security threats and national interests and deciding on capabilities to meet or secure them. Capabilities in turn mean expenditure. This must take the shape of a ‘Strategic Defence Review’ and ‘National Security Strategy’ to define our responses – diplomatic, economic and military. It indicates the military capabilities to be created and maintained. In our context we are unique in never having formally articulated our security concerns. So is our approach to internal conflict, whether indigenous or externally sponsored.

We have a dysfunctional civil-military equation and no formalised and structured forum for collective analysis and policy formulation at the highest level. Views and concerns of the military are more often ignored and side lined and all is assumed to be well. If and when a crisis situation does develop, the response is naturally ad hoc and driven by domestic political considerations. In other words there is no formally articulated policy and approach for handling our security concerns.

Our military approach itself is beset with internal contradictions. The Central Armed Police Forces function independent of the Army and State Police. On active borders like Ladakh, the ITBPF functions independent of the Army. All attempts and suggestions at establishing a unified command structure, including intelligence, with a single point of command, have failed.

Efforts to curb cross border sponsorship of terrorism through diplomatic and economic means has not achieved any results. Internationally, individual national interests override any strong action against the sponsor. By suspending cross border trade we are losing as much, if not more, than Pakistan as also avenues to regional neighbours. And by refusing to talk we have shut the door to any exit route for both countries.

What is available is the conventional military move up the escalatory ladder. However, it entails much higher defence expenditure and diverting resources for the ongoing development works and perhaps more importantly from the ‘welfare and subsidy’ expenditure critical for domestic politics. Nothing indicates our reluctance to invest in defence and national security than the budgetary outlay on defence. As a percentage of GDP it is less than what it was pre 1962.

Much hype is built on the ‘amount’ spent on defence but what is obfuscated is the exchange value of the rupee, adjustment for inflation, increase in GDP in terms of ‘amount’ and increased outlay on populist schemes and the outlay in real terms. Countries spend on defence when their national income and consequently national interests grow or in response to national security interests – we are unique in ignoring both.

The military is a nation’s instrument of last resort. ‘It’s the final argument of kings’. If it fails the nation has nothing to fall back on. Consequently, the nation has to ensure that it is maintained and employed to deliver when all else fails. But we are reluctant to do so. The relationship between the State, Society and the Military has been and will remain complex.

The military stands out in the triad for being structured and equipped to manage violence while the other two are fundamentally oriented towards securing a peaceful and progressive environment often by ‘adjustments driven by expediency’. No organisation cherishes its exclusiveness in terms of role, ethos, culture, values and self-esteem as the military. Handling and dealing with the military requires a deep understanding of the purpose and functioning of the military.

Unfortunately, the abysmal lack of debate in parliament or the public domain on matters military precludes any consensus or collective opinion on matters concerning the military leaving them to bureaucratic arbitration. The results, if not biased, can generously be attributed to lack of comprehensive understanding of such issues.

As Churchill said the Armed Forces are not like a limited liability company to be reconstructed from time to time as the money fluctuates. It is a living thing. If it is bullied, it sulks, if it is unhappy it pines, if it is harried it gets feverish, if it is sufficiently disturbed it will wither and dwindle and almost die, and when it comes to this last serious condition, it is only revived by lots of time and lots of money.

What then does the present state entail? Like in the recent past there are periodic terrorist incidents entailing loss of life, both civilian and military. Our response is at best verbal condemnation and some localised action with indifferent results and ‘normalcy’ is restored. This state is the comfort zone and acceptable to the political establishment. Human life in our country is in any case cheap. Moreover, Insurgency becomes a business for the vested interest, both government and insurgent, especially the local government. North East is a classic example.

What then is our perceived policy towards the proxy war in J&K? Indian policy appears to be on one hand to eliminate as many ‘terrorists’ as possible to force a political solution and at the same time treat security forces casualties as acceptable. What has not been factored is the intangible and intrinsic aspects of terrorist staying power of fresh recruitment, home-grown or externally sponsored, and the attitude of the local population.

The Americans in Vietnam hoped to achieve a ‘tipping point’ forcing the North Vietnamese to negotiate due to the aerial bombing of the North and killing Vietcong in the South. It never came. Unremitting Pak sponsorship of the proxy war would and should result in moving up the escalatory ladder to the full conventional level to deter and punish. That response is precluded due to lack of capability or ‘hollowness’.

Then there is the option and leverage of river waters. All rivers flowing into Pakistan originate in India or flow through India before entering Pakistan. These waters are crucial for Pakistan. The option to control or divert their flow exists. The Indus Water Treaty can be relooked and exploited as a leverage. However, this could generate a military response from Pakistan and climbing up the escalatory ladder for which we need the conventional capability to deter and if required deal with effectively. Consequent world opinion and international law on treaty obligations could be handled if we have a robust economy and strong military capability.

Conventional escalation also raises the issue of having two active and hostile neighbours to deal with for which an appropriate military capability is essential.

Periodically, the political and military leadership sells the idea of recovering Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, what is left unsaid is the non-existent military capability to do so. And what is more, inability to fully integrate Kashmir itself.

As far as the Army is concerned, counter Insurgency operations have been embedded as the route to military awards and career progression. Selection of Chiefs is justified by ‘Extensive Experience in Counter Insurgency Operations’. The military hierarchy is also comfortable with the existing state. Typically the senior leadership is oriented and focussed on counter insurgency with very little emphasis on the understanding and articulation of military issues in the context of geo-political, geo-strategic, geo-economic and diplomatic realms.

Prolonged deployment on internal security duties has resulted in a perceptible decline in the discipline of the Army as well as declining standards of training and orientation for its primary role. It has contributed to imbibing ‘constabulary culture’ and acquiring the ethical moorings of civil society with whom it is constantly in contact. Man-management and unit level administration has also suffered in such an environment compounded by the perennial shortage of officers.

Pakistan may not have achieved cutting away Kashmir from the Indian Union but the three decade employment of the Army in its sponsored Proxy War has resulted in the Army being permanently employed on an armed constabulary role while the 1.4 million strong Central Armed Police Forces and ParaMilitary has practically relinquished their primary internal security mandate.

This has resulted in the Army imbibing the culture and attitude of these forces in dealing with the civil population. It may not be too far off when the Army too thinks, acts and performs as such with the attendant duplicity, political game play and un-soldierly conduct. Paradoxically, while the Central Armed Police Forces continue to grow with attendant expenditure, employing a major portion of the Army in their primary role and thereafter raising concerns about the pay and pension of the Army is the worst form of disservice to the Army.

In the past the military shrugged off the politician and politics as not concerning them. The politician’s disinterest in matters military was a consequence of total ignorance of such matters. While the ignorance remains, the newfound interest of the political class is driven by political mileage and not the interest of the military or national security.

Are we then destined for unending wars? If so and given the all-round comfort with the status quo, the day may not be far when a soldier openly asks ‘Is he the sole guarantor of national security and integrity?’ and ‘Why is he risking his life and limb?’ When that stage is reached, besides the political establishment, the senior military leadership will be equally to blame.

Lt General NS Brar is Former Deputy Chief Integrated Defence Staff. The views expressed here are the writer’s own.