The China-Brokered Saudi-Iran Rapprochement

A question I have been asked by students of International Relations in Delhi and, even by teachers, is: “Why didn’t India do it? Is it not a failure on the part of the Ministry of External Affairs?” The answer is simple: No.

There is no reason to believe that India could have done it. The crux of the matter is that both Riyadh and Tehran wanted to close a chapter of hostility and, at the same time they both wanted to please Beijing by accepting its mediation. Iraq and Oman had been mediating.

Why did Riyadh and Tehran want to close the chapter of hostility? Precisely because it is only a chapter. There are even longer chapters of their working together.

In 1929, three years before the formal proclamation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its founder Ibn Saud and the Shahanshah signed a friendship treaty.

However, an Iranian by name Abu Taleb Yazdi desecrated the Kaaba in 1943 and relations were severed the next year. Despite King Ibn Saudi’s writing to the Shahanshah in 1946, it took 20 years for normality to be restored in 1966 when King Faisal bin Abdulaziz al Saud visited Iran. The two worked together to found the World Muslim League and OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation).

When I reached Tehran as First Secretary in 1976, there was hardly any tension between Riyadh and Tehran. Of course, Iran’s closeness with Israel was a matter of concern to Saudi Arabia. Essentially, the Shahanshah was the superintendent of police for the region appointed by Washington and was accepted as such, by and large, by the rest in the region.

In short, the Shia-Sunni rivalry trotted out by some scholars as the basic explanation for the bad relations between the two countries does not hold water. When relations go bad, either side might invoke that rivalry to support its case and, in the process, aggravate the situation.

The relations soured after the 1979 revolution in Iran when Ayatollah Khomeini decreed that dynastic rule was ‘un-Islamic’ and that Mecca was held by a ‘band of bandits.’ When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Riyadh put in $25 billion to support the war against Iran.

In 1997, the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal attended the OIC meeting in Tehran.

In 2016, Saudi Arabia executed a prominent Shiite cleric Nimr Al Nimr following demonstrations in a part of the kingdom where both oil and Shias were concentrated. The Saudi diplomatic mission in Tehran was stormed and relations were severed. It is that severance that is being repaired now.

Coming to the likely consequences, we need to ask why the two decided to put an end to the latest chapter of hostility.

Coming to Saudi Arabia, where the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) is practically the sole decision-maker, for him this is part of a larger project. He has realised that he had been chasing the mirage of military victory in Yemen since 2015.

The Houthis can send in drones and inflict serious damage on oil installations. There is hardly any fool-proof defence against such drones and Washington cannot be depended upon, least of all, Biden.

Riyadh wants to open a new chapter on the occasion of its hosting the Arab League in May 2023, when Syria’s President Basher al Assad is likely to be invited.

In 2021, MbS had shown maturity by reconciling with Qatar after isolating it in 2017, arguably the saddest chapter in GCC’s history.

MbS has moved closer to China by hosting Xi Jinping (December 2022) with much pomp, in marked contrast to the cold reception accorded to Biden, two months earlier, when he was virtually snubbed with Riyadh refusing to increase oil production as demanded by Biden. OPEC + has recently announced a cut to the tune of 1 million barrels a day.

MbS wants to focus on Neom, to be completed by 2030,the huge city of over 26,500 sq. km. in the Red Sea and China can be a big investor there. Riyadh alone is putting in $500 billion.

Chinese experts have been prospecting for uranium in the kingdom since 2017. MbS was promised nuclear technology by Trump without any agreement on safeguards. But the Senate stopped it.

Coming to Iran, under international criticism for its absurd stance on compulsory hijab, and punished by sanctions by America, it needs new friends. Tehran is not hopeful that the nuclear deal of 2015 would be revived and the sanctions lifted.

If so, Tehran would need to join the Russia-China axis. In that context, it is smart chess to reconcile with Riyadh and to have a wider diplomatic space.

The likely results are: An end to the war in Yemen; strengthening of OPEC + to the detriment of Biden’s prospects for re-election; enormous increase in China’s diplomatic and economic clout in the region; corresponding loss of clout by United States; and the provision of technical assistance for nuclear power by China and Russia to Saudi Arabia.

The clear losers are Washington, Tel Aviv, and New Delhi.

Coming to India, China will do its utmost to spoil India’s plans for Char Bahar, where India’s bureaucratic incompetence and undue fear of Washington’s anger have prevented it from accomplishing tasks on time. Further, India’s plans for a North-South Transport Corridor as an entry to Central Asia might be in some peril.

The corridor might be built as part of China’s Belt and Road. How will India benefit therefrom unless the Char Bahar project is expanded. After all, bad relations with Pakistan prevents road connection to Afghanistan.

Did China ever speak of its mediation before the task was accomplished with Iran and Saudi Arabia meeting in Beijing? In Delhi and in the sections of the media which industriously praise the ‘Vishwa Guru’, we hear so much about India’s ‘mediation’ in Ukraine.

Is it not time for MEA to sit down and write down a balance sheet for the last ten years or so and take consequential action sans headlines?

The section of the media so eager to praise the incumbent government also needs to introspect. Are they serving the nation? Watchdog or lapdog?

Ambassador K. P. Fabian served in IFS from 1964 to 2000. His latest book is ‘The Arab Spring That Was And Wasn’t’ commissioned by Indian Council Of World Affairs.