Sudan - A Descent Into Chaos
The formal economy had disappeared
Famine, death, destruction, displacement, rape, floods, looting and massive human rights abuses. This is what the people of Sudan have been facing since April 2023.
All because two ambitious generals decided to engage in an internal war. The fighting had created the world's biggest internal displacement crisis and left 25 million people, or half the population, in urgent need of humanitarian aid.
The Sudanese formal economy had disappeared. Gold mining which provided a large chunk of revenue had come down to 2 tons as compared to an 18 tons output in previous years.
In an era marked by increasing violence between countries and within countries, global attention is largely focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is focused on Russia versus Ukraine, bloodshed in Lebanon, and assassinations of the Hamas leadership by Israel.
Sudan and its suffering appear to be largely on the fringes of real international concern even though United Nations officials have called the situation the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
Sudan is a country of 50 million people. In a July 2024 report the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) said an estimated 10 million people had been forcibly displaced in Sudan since the war broke out.
While about 7.7 million people were displaced internally, more than two million had fled to neighbouring countries – including Egypt, Chad, the Central African Republic and Ethiopia. The UN’s Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), has said that Sudan is facing the worst food crisis in its history.
In 10 out of 18 states the situation was catastrophic and 18 percent of the population could soon face severe malnutrition and potentially death. Food shortages and insecurity were mainly in areas under Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) control.
Sudan has had more than a dozen coups and coup attempts since it gained independence in 1958. The Sudanese suddenly found themselves caught in the midst of an internal armed conflict that started in April 2023.
The protagonists in the current spate of fighting are two former allies, Army Chief General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, a career soldier from northern Sudan who rose through the ranks under the nearly 30-year rule of former strong man Omar Al-Bashir and General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, once an Al Bashir loyalist and the head of the Rapid Support Forces.
The RSF evolved from the brutal Janjaweed militia in 2013. It was used by former strongman Omar Al Bashir to crush an anti-Arab uprising in Darfur in the early 2000s marked by widespread human rights violations. In 2017, a law was passed making the RSF an independent security force.
In 2019, following major public protests the two Generals had joined hands to oust Al Bashir. Initially, after Al Bashir’s ouster, the civilian Forces for Freedom and Change chose Abdalla Hamdok as the Prime Minister. But in 2021 he was pushed out by the two generals and Al-Burhan took over as the acting Head of State. Dagalo, from Darfur’s camel-herding Arab Rizeigat people, assumed responsibility as his number two.
The rivalry between Al Burhan and Hemedti arose from the Framework Agreement based on a reconciliation agreement and security sector reform plan formulated by the United States and the UN mission in Sudan. It elevated Dagalo to equal status with Al Burhan rather than leaving him as Al Burhan’s deputy.
The security sector reform in the Framework Agreement envisioned a merger of the RSF with the regular army, something which was not acceptable to Dagalo. And the internal war pitting the army against the RSF started on 15 April 2023.
Hemedti was removed from his post in May 2023, and the RSF was officially disbanded by the Sudanese Armed Forces commander in September 2023. These moves took away the legitimacy that the RSF enjoyed revealing the true Janjaweed face of Hemedti’s fighters.
The moment the fighting started Hemedti’s forces captured greater Khartoum. The intensity of the fighting around Khartoum, the capital, had forced General Al -Burhan to move the seat of government to Port Sudan.
The military responded with airstrikes and heavy artillery, but was unable to vanquish the RSF. Then Hemedti consolidated his position across Darfur.
He dismissed the charge that his men were paid through the spoils of war, as they had been accused of looting, and said that they were paid monthly salaries. Across Sudan, the RSF had repeatedly overwhelmed the military.
Hemedti had been strengthened by alliances with tribal militias and other armed groups. At present reports suggested that the RSF had made more gains in Khartoum State, Kordofan, Gezira State, White Nile and Sennar State while the Army had done better in Omdurman. The RSF had also declared that it had complete control of central Darfur.
Both Generals had their separate international patrons. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were close to Sudan’s various military and paramilitary groups. Egypt had been close to the Sudanese army with the two countries' armies regularly conducting war games and joint naval exercises at Port Sudan on the Red Sea.
Egypt had also been interested in protecting its interests in a dispute over Ethiopia’s Blue Nile Dam. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were said to side with Dagalo who had sent his soldiers to fight with the Saudi-led coalition against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.
The US State Department in December 2023 had highlighted that the RSF was guilty of war crimes against humanity and acts of ethnic cleansing. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had on June 13, 2024, adopted a resolution calling on the RSF to end fighting in the North Darfur region.
But as the war progressed Hemedti had launched a Public Relations campaign and diplomatic outreach. He had bolstered his standing almost as an international political figure.
In addition to the UN Secretary General, the US secretary of state had been talking to him. Among others Hemdeti was received for talks by President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa on January 4, 2024 and by President William Ruto of Kenya.
He had even secured an invitation to an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit. Some reports suggested that he had developed close ties with Russia.
Army Chief Al Burhan had also met foreign leaders to bolster support for himself and the army. He had visited Eritrea last year when he started travelling abroad. Egypt, which he also visited, had long been his supporter.
Interestingly, reports in the media said he had met Ukraine’s President Zelensky in Ireland in September 2023 and unconfirmed reports said Ukrainian special forces were helping the army while mercenaries of the Russian Wagner group were siding with the RSF. There were also reports that the Egyptian Air Force had been in action on behalf of the army.
On the financial front Hemedti had taken control of the major part of Sudan’s gold wealth. His fighters were able to get advanced weaponry, and the RSF had come to enjoy significant economic power.
Interestingly, both protagonists were using revenue from the sale of gum arabic, primarily grown in Sudan, to finance their operations.
International efforts to end the fighting had floundered. Several short duration ceasefires had been mediated primarily by the USA, the UN, and Saudi Arabia. None held.
Countries and organisations that had sought to play a role as mediators between Al Burhan and Hemedti included Turkey, Ethiopia, Egypt and Israel as well as the African Union, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. They were not able to achieve anything positive.
The US with Saudi Arabia had actually managed to get the rival sides to enter into talks in 2023 in Jeddah. But the talks broke down at the end of 2023.
A fresh American initiative had been announced for a dialogue in Switzerland between the two sides to be held on August 14,2024 in Geneva, Switzerland. Saudi Arabia would co-host the discussions with the UN, African Union and Egypt acting as observers. The UAE, which continued to obfuscate about its well reported arming of the RSF, would also attend.
The RSF had agreed to return for the talks. But General Al- Burhan, shortly after he survived a drone attack at a military graduation ceremony in eastern Sudan, had said the military would not join the talks as no negotiations were possible until there was a complete withdrawal by the RSF and an end to its expanded operations. The vist of the delegation resulted in no agreement.
Negotiations in the absence of the withdrawal would not be acceptable to the Sudanese people. All that the Government had conceded was that it would send a delegation to Jeddah for discussions with the Americans, relating to the August 14 programme.
Given the fact that the war is about personalities and egos, it appears to be highly unlikely that the Geneva session would achieve any real outcome to end the fighting permanently. It still is a moot question as to what the Sudanese government delegation would be discussing with the Americans in Jeddah before August 14.
In all likelihood the government delegation would insist at least for the RSF to withdraw from Khartoum so that the formal capital of the country returns to its original place. With the RSF achieving successes against the armed forces, Hemedti is unlikely to agree to anything that smacks of his having to take second place to Al Burhan.
Would the war continue after the Geneva discussions, or would the sponsors be able to push for a power sharing agreement that both General Burhan and Hemedti would be comfortable with?
In a situation where foreign powers backing either side have allowed the war to continue for so long, perhaps the only solution that could provide peace to the country would be a decision by the supporters, financiers, arms suppliers of the two rival actions to stop what they have been doing.
Recent history has shown that the arms industry has a life of its own and it needs violent conflagrations to flourish. Therefore, despite meetings in luxurious capitals, it is highly improbable that the Sudanese people, currently facing floods and famine , would actually be able to enjoy a peaceful future.