Worried About The Islamic State In India? Don't Be

NEW DELHI: About a dozen people suspected to be associated with the Islamic State in India were arrested across the country in the last week, with officials saying that the accused were in the process of planning and executing IS-style terror strikes. The news makes for scary reading -- investigators found pictures detailing bomb-making, recovered a black powdery substance suspected of being a low-grade explosive, and seized videos and other jihadi propaganda material. Even more significantly, one of the 14 people arrested, Bengaluru-resident Abdul Ahad, had been deported from Turkey as he was caught trying to reach Syria last year. Investigators also believe that the group since detained were radicalised by a figure known as Yousuf, who is suspected to be former Indian Mujahideen member Shafi Armar.

With India on high alert leading up to the Republic Day parade, the chief guest of which is French President Francois Hollande, the news of the Islamic State in India acquires urgency. For the last few days, concerned friends have sent me a number of articles detailing this threat. Others have posted comments on social media, terrified for the future of this country. Still others have cautioned against going to crowded public spaces, because “the Islamic State is active in India.”

When I respond with skepticism regarding the Islamic State’s reach, presence or influence in India, even friends and acquaintances who usually take my opinion fairly seriously, roll their eyes and continue their Daesh doomsday discussion. After all, the Islamic State does include India in its idea of a Caliphate, and the group has also referred to India in its propaganda material, specifically in the form of criticism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and communalism in the country, going as far as to issue instructions on how to wage a covert war.

So why am I not worried? For one, there is no proof that the Islamic State is active in India. The 14 people arrested were part of a loosely formed outfit known as Junud-ul-Khalifa-e-Hind or Soldiers of the Indian Caliphate. Though the men involved swear allegiance to the Islamic State, there is no evidence of them ever having communicated with the Islamic State. It is far more likely that they are a group influenced by the Islamic State -- which means they do not have the parent group’s training or resources, and are acting entirely independently. This does not qualify as the “Islamic State in India” but rather, “an ill-equipped group influenced by the Islamic State in India”, but I guess the latter doesn’t make for as catchy a headline.

Further, going by the numbers, the influence of the Islamic State in India is itself tiny. Only 25 Indians are believed to have been influenced by the group to the extent of making the journey to Syria or Iraq -- a figure that is so miniscule when compared with other countries (those with much tinier Muslim populations at that), that the entire “Islamic State in India” theory begins to sound preposterous. Compare this number to even Western countries: About 2700 Russians are believed to have fought for the group (with 1600 Russian citizens reportedly killed), 750 Britons, up to 1600 people from France, 600 from Germany, 520 from Belgium, 250-300 from Sweden, 300 from Bosnia Herzegovina, over a 100 people from the United States… the list goes on.

Even countries like Switzerland (35-40), Italy (70-80) and Spain (50-100) have larger numbers of people travelling to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State in comparison to India.

Here are the numbers in detail: http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html

(Source: Radio Free Europe)

A related reason to the absence of the Islamic State’s influence in India is the nature of terror in India. Broadly speaking, terror in India can be divided into Pakistan-supported terror in Kashmir and elsewhere (terror in the form of the Pathankot attack will fall within this category), and other forms of terror, with the latter including Hindu terror. Terror is overtly political, and India’s political narrative is tied to its South Asian geopolitical location, rather than the appeal of a Pan-Islamic Caliphate.

This point is applicable to terror across the world. It will be prudent to not exaggerate the influence of the Islamic State outside of Syria and Iraq, as political compulsions are always localised. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance -- two countries where the influence of the Islamic State has received a fair share of international attention -- the appeal of the group has less to do with its ideology and more to do with the fact that there are factions within the militant movements, with many disaffecting soldiers joining what are still nascent groupings associated with the Islamic State. In the case of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well, the ties of the local groups to the parent group in Syria and Iraq remain unknown. The question remains whether the Islamic State parent group is actively involved in recruiting or training or is the Islamic State in Afghanistan or Pakistan an independent initiative that bears the name for the sake of bearing the name?

Ask yourself this: Are Afghans and Pakistani militants more concerned with fighting the Afghan and Pakistani state respectively and capturing local political control, or are they suddenly somehow driven by the ideology of a Pan-Islamic form of terror, with political control centred far away in Syria and Iraq?

To demonstrate this point further, several of the attacks claimed by the Islamic State in Afghanistan seem to have no link to the group. Afghan officials and Nato forces in Afghanistan have gone on the record to say they doubt the claims of the Islamic State’s influence in the country. IS’ claim on an attack in Jalalabad -- one of the biggest such attacks claimed by the group in the country -- has also been questioned. "We have not yet seen evidence of ISIS direction or support of the attacks," Lt. Col. Christopher Belcher, spokesman for the international military coalition in Afghanistan, said in a statement reproduced by Reuters.

"Jalalabad continues to be an area with significant Taliban influence, and this attack fits the pattern of past Taliban attacks in the region, underscoring that this attack does not represent a fundamental change in the security environment." Daesh itself seems to be unclear on whether it carried out the attack or not. “ISIS was not behind the deadly blast in Jalalabad, and we condemn such an attack,” Sheikh Muslim Dost, a spokesperson for the group in Afghanistan, told The Daily Beast. “This is an act of the Pakistani agencies to damage reputation of the ISIS.”

Despite the above, the headlines following the Jalalabad attack focussed almost entirely on the Islamic State’s role.

My point is that exaggerating the Islamic State’s influence is often the result of media sensationalism, without a proper understanding of the factors at play.

To reiterate, the problem with Pan-Islamic narratives of terror is that they fail to take into consideration the local context, most specifically political, and while the Islamic State has been more successful than any other group in breaching political barriers, its limitations in doing so have to also be recognised and accounted for. The Islamic State is not a homogenous group with worldwide appeal, it has to contend for that space with a range of other groups -- the Al Qaeda, the Al Nusra Front, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, to name just a few. And whilst the Islamic State holds sway of the political space in Syria and Iraq, outside of that stronghold it is other groups that dominate the landscape.

Those reading this may point to the Paris attacks as proof that the Islamic State’s actions are not localised. It is pertinent to remember that the men who carried out the attack were not Syrians or Iraqis, but rather, Belgian and French nationals who had travelled to Syria and fought with the Islamic State, before returning to France and Belgium. Here, the local context of Muslim minorities in western countries is a factor that needs more attention than any notion of Pan-Islamism.

Further, how is what happened in France any different from what could happen in India? Read this article from the beginning, with specific attention to the fact that there is no known link between any IS suspects in India and the Islamic State, the tiny number of people who have traveled from India to Syria or Iraq, and most importantly, the nature of terror in India, where the Indian Muslim has an insignificant role to play (that said, this could change if alienation amongst minorities in India continues to grow, but that’s a subject best left for another article).

In conclusion, when it comes to terror in India, it’s more realistic to worry about the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, naxalism, the NSCN, and saffron terror groups…

But I guess headlines with any of those outfits won’t get the same kind of attention as “the Islamic State in India.” More so when the French President is visiting.