While disbelief and dread greeted the news of the Russian offensives into Ukraine on February 24 2022, mixed emotions prevailed as the Ukrainian Counter offensives got underway. Military Offensives seem to be the dominant option for attainment of political objectives.
However, offensives in the 21st Century, carry a disproportionately high probability of “unintended outcomes”.
Violent and unforgiving conflict is no stranger to recent times. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and conflicts in Africa scar humanity and the planet.
This war however is distinctive. The second war in Europe since World War II, it’s a conflict between a nuclear super power, and a nation that gave up nuclear weapons in 1994. A military conflict launched by a UN Permanent Member of the Security Council, in a singular capacity.
It is a conflict which can be viewed in polar opposites, depending on which ‘machan’ you sit on. While defying objective assessment, it’s a war that carries the macabre spectre of nuclear war, and its promise of apocalypse.
Often depicted as a Black Swan occurrence, it's typically a Grey Rhino event. The term represents an overlooked but highly probable event with great impact.
Removed from semantics it is a war that has waged over a year, with immense loss of life, livelihood and futures. Displacement and disruption of approximately 15 million people, several crippled and millions in trauma.
The complex and intertwined consequences of this war reverberate around the globe, in a world which was interconnected and feverishly gravitating to a globalised paradigm. Energy stress, trade and financial disruption, spiralling inflation and uncertain economies have become conventional companions.
Russian geographic and strategic suffocation from access to the free seas, has been a core driver in their history. With Ivan the Great’s defeat of the Mongols on the River Urga in 1480, Russian expansion commenced.
In 1777 Catharine the Great captured Crimea, established Sevastopol base, and in 1829 the (Treaty of Edirne), guaranteed free access to the Russian fleet and shipping through the Turkish Straits. This genesis leads people to believe that the war in Ukraine is all about the sea. The fact remains it is about both territory and the seas.
The Russian perspective on Ukraine is largely unambiguous; it is viewed as a territory whose full sovereignty is impractical, and any strategic linkages to the west impermissible.
Ukrainian identity and nationalism go back to the Kivyan Rus of 882 AD. A distinctive form of Christianity evolved from the Slavic Rite in 989 AD, to the Ukrainian Rite, firmly centred in Kyiv.
Despite being divided among empires, absorbing diverse populations, and repeatedly being suppressed, Ukrainian ambition for independence as well as desire to pursue its way of life has been constant. We do not have space to go into a complex history but, its response to the Russian invasion has been the true mirror of the Ukrainian soul.
The recent crisis flows more acutely from the internal events of 2004 Orange Revolution, 2014 Euromaidan assertions, and the festering insurgencies in the Ukrainian Eastern Oblasts. The NATOs enthusiastic expansion from 12 nations, to the present 31, Russian resurgence and power politics, outcomes in Syria, and diplomatic brinkmanship have all contributed to this war.
Did Russia have a raison d’ etre for its priorities? Undoubtedly so. The rapid expansion of NATO eastwards, and constant Western efforts in Ukraine to marginalise Russian interests were conclusively adverse. Did these however justify the launch of offensives? No. Till Jan 2022, a finely balanced game of chess manifested.
The Russians had a good rationale and command on the Chessboard. The launch of the Russian three-pronged offensive in February 2022, immediately transformed the game to Roulette, with centres of international compellence now huddling on the table.
Offensives crossing international borders must be assured of very high levels of success. Quite the contrary emerged. The Russian offensives commenced with a stuttering and came to a shuddering halt North of Kyiv.
In the East and the South, they plodded but could never come into their own. From strategy to leadership and tactical manifestation, a lot was amiss.
The central factor however was that the Russian Juggernaut never appreciated being opposed by a committed, motivated and tenacious soldiers and populace that fought an Intelligent War. A well planned Fifth Column melted away, and Russian equipment designed for 1000 KM of offensive action, could not survive through 150 KM of opposition, on the thrust to Kyiv.
Before we shift to the Ukrainian counter offensives, let's view the political objectives, albeit simplistically. The Russian Strategic View, involves capture of maximum territory, with complete mastery in the East and South of Ukraine. Liberation of these territories and their integration into Russian space.
Regime change in Ukraine, permanent expulsion of any NATO, presence and linkage in Ukraine. The Ukrainians on the other hand want complete eviction of the Russian presence from all their territory, Sovereign autonomy to choose their future linked to Europe and NATO. Militarily through offensives, neither side has the capability to achieve their objectives.
There is also a cacophony of contradictions. Russian efforts to keep NATO out of Ukraine, failed the moment they attacked, since NATO elements and equipment are now de facto fully integrated. De Jure status matters little.
The extreme eastern Ukrainian Oblasts are committed to Russia, and identify with them. What is the utility of Ukraine fighting for the liberation and integration of regions that do not desire unification with them? A lot of NATO aspirations are linked to defeating Russia in Ukraine by proxy.
The fear in Europe of Russian aggressive designs has manifested as a reality, with Finland joining NATO and four more aspirants including Sweden, champing at the bit. This was an outcome Russia never wanted. Obsession with military solutions in a 21st Century paradigm, cannot be based on outcomes of past wars.
The Ukrainian Counter Offensive/s, after the bloodbath of the battle for Bakhmut which Ukraine lost, is intriguing. Is there a strategic moment that justifies them? Is it political rhetoric and grandstanding that has forced Ukraine’s military moves?
These questions remain since they have commenced. The offensives are however in distributed entities with limited objectives. Momentum and velocity the life blood of offensive military action is absent. Has Ukraine not considered the last 15 months of conflict, and assessed the overpowering force levels required for counter offensives?
Whether there is an offensive design, or in fact the Ukrainian offensives will dry out, only time will show. We sit far from the conflict, and much further from intelligent estimates. Could it be that Ukraine is intimately aware of the inherent weaknesses of the Russian Armed Forces?
A weakness and fragility recently revealed by the “Mutiny” of the Wagner mercenary Army. Undoubtedly a prime fighting outfit, which has been in the forefront of the capture of Bakhmut among other objectives. The continued harangue of Yevgeny Prigozhin, their leader against Russian leadership and Military, peaked recently in a march onto Moscow.
The armed troops and equipment made their way unopposed, and reportedly cheered on by the populace. A last-minute deal was engineered and they stopped. At any rate the Russian Army was completely absent.
The dangerous dimensions of this war include the fact that whether the Nord Stream or the Kakhava Dam, there has been no hesitation in destroying critical infrastructure. “No contact war” based on long range artillery, drones, and missiles has been liberally used to target life and infrastructure.
Dangers emanating from the Zaporizhian nuclear plant remain present. All ingredients of unpredictability and potential storms.
No realistic assessment of the enormous costs of this war is possible since the extent is enormous. Ukraine’s reconstruction alone is estimated at $411 billion. At a time when the world focus should be on poverty alleviation, climate change, and development of humankind, unpredictability haunts the future.
Perhaps someone should have pondered over the words of Krishna Deva Raya (AD 1509, Vijay Nagar), who spent his life in successful conquest: “A King should be clever not impulsive; never make a vow regarding the enemy, for an invasion can stop and go for a long time and it may not be successful.”
Lt General Sanjiv Langer PVSM, AVSM.(Veteran) is former Deputy Chief
Integrated Defence Staff. Views expressed here are the writer's own.
Cover Photograph: Courtesy Reuters. Wagner group fighters pull out of Rostov-on-Don