Truman, Hiroshima, And Nagasaki

On President Truman’s orders, the United States military detonated an atomic bomb over Hiroshima on August 6 1945 at 8.15 A.M. local time, killing 140,000 human beings. Truman, 16 hours later, called on Japan to surrender.

He threatened a ‘rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on earth’. Tokyo did not surrender, and a second bomb was detonated over Nagasaki on August 9, killing 70,000.

On August 10, Japan decided to surrender and on August 15 Emperor Hirohito announced the decision to surrender.

It is conventional wisdom that the surrender was caused by the use of atomic bombs and that the strike on Nagasaki was necessary to end World War 2. However, there is indubitable historical evidence that conventional wisdom has got it wrong.

First, while in retrospect Hiroshima and Nagasaki are seen as instances of destruction on an unprecedented scale, that is not how Japan saw it then. For months the US military had been fire-bombing cities causing destruction on a vast scale.

For example, Tokyo was bombed on March 9 and 10, 1945 with a grim toll of 120,000 killed. On August 8, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo requested Prime Minister Admiral Kantaro Suzuki to convene a meeting of the Supreme Council to discuss Hiroshima; the request was rejected.

Two, the Supreme Council did meet on August 9 and considered surrender. When the meeting began the attack on Nagasaki had not occurred. It follows that neither Hiroshima, nor Nagasaki caused the discussion about surrender.

Three, the reason for summoning the meeting on August 9 was Stalin’s declaration of war on the evening of August 8. Soviet troops were attacking Manchuria in the early morning hours of August 9. Tokyo and Moscow had signed a neutrality pact in April 1941, valid for 5 years.

In short, Japan decided to consider surrender only because the Supreme Council assessed that it could not fight both the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), at the same time.

Was it necessary to use the atomic bomb to compel Japan to surrender? No. Tokyo had started considering the terms it should insist on when it should surrender as early as May 1945.

The Japanese Navy was losing its fighting power, and there was no defence against the fire-bombing by the US Air Force. Germany surrendered in May 1945, and the Allies could concentrate all their force on Japan.

The Supreme Council agreed to seek the good offices of Stalin to get acceptable terms for surrender. The terms varied as the war progressed to the advantage of the Allies, but the most important condition was that the Emperor should not be put on trial or otherwise humiliated.

Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow was instructed by Foreign Minister Togo to talk to the Soviet Union by the last week of June 1945. The instructions were sent by code that US intelligence had broken.

There were several exchanges between Sato and Togo. Truman knew that Tokyo wanted to surrender. Yet Truman insisted on ‘unconditional surrender’ in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26 1945.

Here we need to examine Truman’s approach to the use of the atomic bomb. As Vice President he was not kept in the loop about the top-secret Manhattan Project.

He got confirmation of the first successful detonation of an atomic bomb, known as the Trinity Test, conducted on July 16 1945 when he was already in Potsdam. He shared it with Prime Minister Winston Churchill immediately.

Eight days later, Truman hinted about a new weapon of huge destructive power to Stalin after the latter had agreed to join the war against Japan.

Little did Truman know that Stalin was kept informed about the Manhattan Project by Klaus Fuchs, a UK scientist working in the Manhattan Project.

He used to inform Igor Kurchatov who headed the Soviet counterpart of the Manhattan Project launched in 1942. Stalin sent instructions to Igor Kurchatov to speed up after conversation with Truman.

Truman had a few reasons or motives for using the bomb. He held that the bomb that cost $2 billion should be used. He dismissed the plea of scientists for conducting an explosion in an unpopulated area so that the whole world including Japan will know how destructive it was.

He was convinced that America could maintain its monopoly over the technology and that the bomb could be used for promoting America’s geopolitical interests for many years.

We do not know whether Truman would have used the bomb against a European enemy. Its use against a non-Western enemy was not all that difficult a decision to take.

There is reason to believe that Truman intended to send a message to Stalin about American superiority by hitting Japan. Truman succeeded in excluding the USSR from having any role in Japan.

Why did Japan give the impression that the bomb compelled it to surrender? Following the defeat of Germany in May 1945, it was clear to Japan that its plans to dominate Asia and retain the captured colonies of the West were doomed to failure.

Since Japan embarked on aggression with the approval of the Emperor, and since the Emperor was divine, what could explain Japan’s impending defeat, despite the willingness of the Japanese soldier to kill and die for his Emperor? It appeared to some Japanese that the Emperor was at fault and even an abortive coup was attempted.

It suited Japan to say that the new weapon of huge destructive power made it necessary for it to surrender. Further, Japan wanted to surrender to America before the Soviet troops reached the north of Japan.

Do nuclear weapons afford protection and deterrence? Obviously, there is deterrence. Otherwise, NATO would have acted differently in Ukraine.

Washington knows that Russia might resort to the use, or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, if Ukraine makes serious inroads into Russian territory using NATO-supplied weapons.

Do nuclear weapons give protection? Not exactly. There is a MAD - Mutually Assured Destruction - relationship between Washington and Moscow. Is that protection?

Are the US and Russia serious about nuclear disarmament? The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty adopted in 1968 provides for nuclear disarmament under Article 6: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

I was posted as First Secretary in Vienna at that time. I remember my Ambassador Vishnu Trivedi explaining India’s view on nuclear proliferation at IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency).

Nuclear proliferation can happen in two ways, vertical or horizontal. When a non-nuclear weapon State acquires nuclear weapons it is horizontal proliferation. When a nuclear-weapon-state increases its nuclear armoury, it is vertical proliferation.

In retrospect, it is evident that proliferation has occurred both vertically and horizontally. Article 6 was never taken seriously.

Israel has, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 80 intact nuclear weapons of which 50 are for delivery by Jericho 11 medium range missiles. However, Israel has neither denied nor confirmed that it has nuclear weapons.

North Korea acquired nuclear weapons because Washington refused to sign a peace treaty after the Korean War ended with a ceasefire in 1953.

As of now nine States have 12,512 nuclear weapons , enough to blow up the world many times. The two superpowers developed such an irrationally large armoury during the Cold War.

Truman was a principal promoter of the Cold War. It was an unnecessary war. More on that another time.

Ambassador K. P. Fabian served in IFS from 1964 to 2000. His latest book is ‘The Arab Spring That Was And Wasn’t’ commissioned by Indian Council Of World Affairs. Views expressed here are the writer's own.